

right. We don't say that the distinguished Senator from Kentucky is wrong. He may later on, with the authority, prevail. They might increase spending. Like I say, we are not spending more on yogurt and Crackerjacks, and whatever else they had around here. I have forgotten the things they brought up. I would not have dared to stand up as a candidate and say I spent \$86,000 for food. I could not hope to get elected in South Carolina buying \$86,000 worth of lunches. That, perhaps, points to the dilemma.

The public that I represent and have worked with over the years really is asking and begging. That is why they included the States.

Mr. President, we know that, as in warfare, he who controls the air controls the battlefield. In politics, he who controls the airwaves controls the campaign. That is where all the money is. That is what we are trying to limit. But I do not say that by voting for this that you limit. I only say that by voting for this you give constitutional authority because you see the extremes of the Supreme Court—it is the "Extreme Court of the United States"—when they come with the Buckley versus Valeo distortion. It is the "Extreme Court of the United States" that comes with Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee against the Federal Election Commission.

So, right to the point, we are saying that we can amend this Constitution, that the last five of six amendments dealt with elections, that certainly the weight of money as qualifying a vote was constitutionally outlawed in the 24th amendment. We ought to outlaw extreme and expensive expenditures in this. That would be the 28th amendment, I think. They approved these particular amendments in 18.1 months, which was the average. We know we can get this approved next year in 1998, and we will be on the road to really getting campaign finance reform.

This is the acid test. Do you believe in limiting, or do you not believe in limiting? We are talking about expenditure of paid speech—not free speech. It does not affect free speech whatever. You don't affect it under the Constitution. We wouldn't dare try to affect it under the Constitution. And, of course, after the 30 years and all of the debates in three Congresses having given us a majority here in the U.S. Senate saying we believe in a constitutional amendment and let's see if we can at least get that majority, they are really coming now and are so opposed to McCain-Feingold and are so opposed to any campaign finance reform as to vote this down. Then we will know exactly where they stand.

I thank my distinguished colleague from Kentucky. I appreciate the debate this afternoon.

I yield the floor.

Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Tuesday, March 11, the Federal debt stood at \$5,357,359,481,153.10.

One year ago, March 11, 1996, the Federal debt stood at \$5,017,404,000,000.

Five years ago, March 11, 1992, the Federal debt stood at \$3,848,675,000,000.

Ten years ago, March 11, 1987, the Federal debt stood at \$2,249,369,000,000.

Fifteen years ago, March 11, 1982, the Federal debt stood at \$1,048,663,000,000 which reflects a debt increase of more than \$4 trillion (\$4,308,696,481,153.10) during the past 15 years.

#### NOMINATION OF FEDERICO PEÑA

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, I voted in favor of Federico Peña to be the new Secretary of Energy for the Clinton administration in the sincere hope that he will be able to provide the Department of Energy with the leadership and direction it needs to provide the proper stewardship of our national energy and security needs in the 21st century.

I have addressed the Energy and Natural Resources Committee with my grave concerns about the current direction of the Department of Energy, especially with respect to the maintenance and stewardship of our nuclear weapons complex. I wish to use this forum, and the occasion of the Senate vote on Federico Peña, to restate my concerns and to reiterate my hope that the current trend at the Department of Energy will be reversed.

Of particular concern has been former Secretary Hazel O'Leary's technically insupportable insistence that the United States can both maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and permanently forego nuclear testing. What is more, her lack of familiarity with the critical work of the Nation's nuclear weapons laboratories appears to have emboldened her to exert immense pressure on their directors to abandon the labs' longstanding view that the nuclear stockpile cannot be certified without periodic underground testing.

Indeed, the nuclear weapons complex that the next Secretary of Energy will inherit from former Secretary Hazel O'Leary is a shadow of its former self, thanks in no small measure to a Clinton administration policy which the distinguished chairman of the House National Security Committee, Representatives FLOYD SPENCE, has called erosion by design. In releasing a study of this reckless policy on October 30, 1996, Representative SPENCE observed that:

"The past four years have witnessed the dramatic decline of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and the uniquely skilled workforce that is responsible for maintaining our nuclear deterrent. The Administration's laissez-faire approach to stewardship of the nuclear stockpile, within the broader context of its support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is clearly threatening the Nation's long-term ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile. \* \* \* In my mind, it's no longer a question of the Administration's 'benign neglect' of our Nation's nuclear forces, but instead, a compelling case can be made that is a matter of 'erosion by design.'"

Mr. President, I share the concerns expressed in Representative SPENCE's study about the implications of the Clinton-O'Leary program for denuclearizing the United States. In this regard, two portions of the Spence report deserve special attention.

#### Stockpile stewardship:

The Clinton Administration's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program [SSMP] entails significant technological risks and uncertainties. Certification that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe and reliable—in the context of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—depends on developing highly advanced scientific diagnostic tools that do not yet exist and may not work as advertised. Funding shortfalls, legal challenges and other problems are almost certain to continue to impede progress in achieving the program's ambitious goals, and raise serious doubts about the ability of the program to serve as an effective substitute for nuclear testing. The Administration's commitment to implementing the SSMP and, more broadly, to maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile is called into question by DOE's failure to adequately fund the SSMP and to conduct important experiments.

#### Dismantling the DOE weapons complex:

Unprecedented reductions and disruptive reorganizations in the nuclear weapons scientific and industrial base have compromised the ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile. The cessation of nuclear-related production and manufacturing activities has resulted in the loss of thousands of jobs and critical capabilities \* \* \*. DOE still lacks concrete plans for resuming the production of tritium \* \* \*. Unlike Russia or China, the United States no longer retains the capacity for large-scale plutonium "pit" production and DOE's plans to reconstitute such a capacity may be inadequate.

#### INFORMATION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

Yet another alarming legacy of former Secretary O'Leary's tenure as Secretary of Energy could be the repercussions of her determination to declassify some of the Nation's most closely held information. As a result, efforts by unfriendly nations—and perhaps subnational groups—bent on acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities have been afforded undesirable insights into designs, developmental experiences and vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear devices.

Of particular concern is the fact that data concerning the precise quantities